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ABSTRACT

The more diversified the economy, the greater Texas's possibilities for security and stability. The state cannot diversify the job and business structure unless there is an educational system prepared to develop Texas's human resources to their fullest. The state's population will be over 40 percent minority by the end of the century, and student minority populations will exceed 50 percent; thus, a good base exists for future middle class minority development. Because equal opportunities must start at a very early age, a statewide Head Start-type program would be a wise and cost-effective investment. All through the Texas educational system, local leadership has been frustrated by the continuing attempt to run things from the top of the political structure, and local school principals have been unable to develop new curricula that are geared to the specific needs of their students. The higher education system in Texas greatly emphasizes the "flagship" institution. Higher education programs do not reflect the current diversity in the state's population, particularly in terms of transfers and percentages of students who graduate. Special attention must be paid to a state program that will create winners, not just pick them. (10 references) (KM)

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

THE STATE AND ITS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

EA 021 771

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The report brings together a wide range of materials having to do with Texas. This diversity could not have been accomplished without a computer program called Super-File, which has been a joy to use. The author's gratitude goes to FYI, Incorporated and the geniuses who made it possible.

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Errors of fact and interpretation, however, remain the responsibility of the author.

Harold L. Hodgkinson
American Council on Education
Washington, D.C.

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Cover Note:

This most unusual map of Texas shows how the state looks demographically. Texas is a very urban state—80% of its 14 million people live in its 26 metropolitan areas, more Metros than California! In thinking about Texas' future, these areas are the social equivalants of mountains, rivers and roads on conventional maps. "People Maps" like this one are becoming increasingly important tools for politicians and marketers of products and services.

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TEXAS:
THE STATE AND ITS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

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TEXAS: THE STATE AND ITS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

There is something schizophrenic about even *trying* to describe Texas—almost everything about the state seems contradictory. If you ask an American to describe the average Texan (not J. R. Ewing), you would probably get an answer straight out of a Marlboro ad—the tall Texas cowpoke riding, alone, into the sunset. This for a state in which 79.6% of its 14 million citizens reside in its *26* metropolitan areas, the largest number of metros in any state! Can we imagine an urban Texas? The cover of this publication suggests that we had better learn.

At the beginning of the Eighties, the futurists (of which this author is definitely *not* a member) were touting a monolithic notion of a "Sunbelt" in which all the action was taking place, and a "Frostbelt" (waggishly referred to as the Rust Bowl) which was nothing but decay and gloom, extending from Michigan to New York. The capital city of the Sunbelt was Houston (the City of Tomorrow), the Frostbelt was exemplified by Detroit (Will the last person out of Detroit please turn out the lights?). It is interesting to track our new key cities during this decade.

There is no doubt that since the publication of books like *Megatrends*, the Sunbelt-Frostbelt notion is in need of drastic revision. In terms of people, jobs, housing starts, and other indicators, Houston is in deep trouble today. (In 1984, 20% of Houston's office space was unrented, and in that year Detroit had 4 times as many industrial building approvals as Houston.)

As this is being written in September, 1986, Texas is $3.5 billion in the hole (the largest state budget deficit in U.S. history), and Ann Richards, the state Treasurer, has said that she will be writing hot checks by December, with no current state money to cover them. Governor White's one-year sales tax proposal and some $580 million in proposed budget cuts would still leave the state $1.5 billion in the red. The cause of all this trouble? Most would say



the rapid decline in world oil prices. A more careful look would produce other factors:

- As the American population ages, beef consumption, a major part of the Texas economy, will continue to decline.
- Although it would be possible, Texas does not "save for a rainy day" when times are good.
- Strategic planning at the state level is not a Texas hallmark.
- Strategic planning at the metro level is not a Texas hallmark.
- Although Texas is a low-tax state on any measure, there is a reluctance to increase taxes to maintain services.

Although much of this material is pessimistic about the future of the Lone Star State, it must be said that the potential for future economic and social development in the state remains, like everything else in the state—vast. However, progress will require (1) a much more diversified economy, (2) a "pay-as-you-go" plan for state services and infrastructure, rather than using present growth to mortgage the future, and (3) much improved possibilities for life fulfillment, particularly through the educational system, for the state's 4.5 million minority citizens.

To begin our analysis, let's look at some basic data from the 1980 Census. The ethnic, socio-economic and cultural diversity behind these numbers is compelling. Minority populations represent 35% of the state's population base, and 46% of its youth. It is vital to the future of Texas that these groups receive the kinds of education that will allow them to achieve their aspirations. (One of the *major* agendas of the state should be the development and nourishment of a significant middle class group for each of its major minorities.) In addition, minorities in public schools in Texas represent not 35 but 46% of Texas youth. Youth tend to grow up (a simple but vital trick), leading to a Texas in 2010 which will contain minority populations of

TEXAS PROFILE

1980 Population	3rd	14,229,191
Black Population	3rd	1,710,175
Percent Black	17th	12%
Hispanic Population	2nd	2,985,824
Percent Hispanic	2nd	21%
Asian American Population	5th	150,000
Percent Asian American	n.a.	1–2%
Foreign Born	11th	6%
Over 65 in Age	38th	9.6%
Under 18	8th	30.3%
Median Age	42nd	28 Years
High School Graduates	42nd	69%
College Graduates	23rd	16.9%
Women in the Work Force	23rd	50.7%
Median Household Income	25th	$16,708
Housing Value	29th	$47,400
Growth Rate, 1970–80	10th	27%

close to 50%, very similar to California. In addition to the semantic problem of what we call minorities when they are half or more of a population, there is also the economic development issue, if Texas continues to rank 42nd in the percentage of its youth who graduate from high school.

Of the 233,357 ninth graders in Texas in 1980, only 161,580, or 69 percent, graduated from high school in 1984. During those years, Minnesota graduated an incredible *96%*. Our largest and most diverse states—Texas, California, New York and Florida, all rank in the bottom 10 states on this crucial measure. These four states alone produced 654,449 of the 2,503,283 high school graduates in 1984, about one quarter of the U.S. total. But this was from their 960,579 ninth graders, meaning that they also produced about *306,130 dropouts!* Although dropout statistics are not totally precise, (they leave out things like interstate migration), the possibility of a third of a million young people moving into adult life without a high school diploma is not a happy one.

The state has a very young population, with relatively few (about 10%) of its citizens over 65. This is due in part to the rapid growth in the state's population during the 70's. (Immigrants tend to be on the young side and tend to have children, particularly minority immigrants.) The hardest, yet most vital, prediction to make about the future of Texas is *whether or not that previous rate of growth will continue for the rest of the decade*. A reasonable guess (based on the 1985 numbers that are available) is that growth will be about half the growth rate of the Seventies. The Hispanic growth rate is bound to increase, due to both immigration and to the high fertility rate of Mexican Americans, currently 2.9 children per female, compared to 1.7 for white females. (Lest this be misunderstood, it must be pointed out that during the Baby Boom, the white fertility rate was 2.9 children. Minority fertility rates are not increasing, white fertility in the U.S. is *decreasing*.)

Another fascinating thing about Texas is the "net" of people moving in and out. This kind of data is almost never mentioned in the media:

TEXAS POPULATION MOVEMENT: 1975–1980

	ALL	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC
IN:	1,778,780	1,451,348	132,124	276,600
OUT:	862,230	730,188	67,116	97,702
NET:	+916,550	+721,160	+65,008	+178,898

What these numbers mean is that half as many whites moved out as moved in, and the same for blacks, while only 35% as many Hispanics moved out compared to Hispanics who moved in—Hispanics are *over*represented in the "net" column. They move in, they have children and they STAY. The two broadest "highways" for interstate migration are Texas-California and New York-Florida. Texas-New York (or vice versa) would be "unnatural."

Moving back to our first table, the percentage of the Texas population holding college degrees is quite small, and distributed very unequally in the state (Austin has one of the highest rates of doctoral holders in the country, while other areas of the state are very low on this measure.) Relatively few Texans have benefitted directly from higher education—as with income, Texans are seldom in the middle; they are either rich or poor, well educated or poorly educated. Because a small percentage of Texas women work, household income is depressed. These days, a middle class family almost has to have two wage earners to maintain that level. If housing were not as relatively cheap in Texas as it is, the middle class would be in even deeper trouble.

We also need to get a feel for where in Texas people have been moving. In general, the answer is as American as apple pie—to the suburbs. However, unlike almost all major metro areas in the U.S., which have *declined* in their core city residency while expanding the suburban living, many Texas metros have expanded in both directions:

TEXAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT: 1970–1980

	1970	1980	%
DALLAS:			
ALL	2,377,623	2,974,805	+25.1%
CORE	1,237,856	1,289,242	+ 4.2%
SUBURBAN	1,139,767	1,685,563	+47.9%
HOUSTON:			
ALL	1,999,316	2,905,353	+45.3%
CORE	1,233,535	1,595,138	+29.3%
SUBURBAN	766,781	1,310,215	+71.1%

These two cities represent 6 million of Texas' 14 million people. Unlike most other major metros in the U.S., these two have been able to keep the core city growing while at the same time feeding suburban development. It is highly doubtful that the cores can be kept growing in the next decade for our two Texas cities; indeed, the *suburbs* in Dallas and Houston may see some actual declines. We are not used to managing suburbs with shrinking populations.

Another way to think about suburban growth involves the degree to which minorities are able to move to the suburbs, thus establishing one criterion for middle class membership. Using the data prepared for *All One System*, Dallas ranks 14th in the number of blacks who live in its suburbs, while Houston ranks 16th:

BLACK SUBURBAN RESIDENCE

	IN METRO	IN CORE	IN SUBURBS	
DALLAS	313,000	265,000	48,000	15.3%
HOUSTON	513,000	439,000	74,000	14%

TEXAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT: 1970–1980



TEXAS: WORK FORCE AND INDUSTRIES

	% OF WORKERS	INDEX
AGRICULTURE, MINING, FISH, FOREST	6.3%	158
CONSTRUCTION	8.8%	146
MANUFACTURING	17.9%	80
TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS	7.5%	103
RETAIL, WHOLESALE TRADE	21.9%	107
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE	6.0%	100
BUSINESS, REPAIR, PERSONAL SERVICES	8.8%	105
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES	18.5%	91
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	4.5	85

For comparison, 69% of Miami's blacks live in the suburbs while Los Angeles and Atlanta are at 46%. In the study of the black middle class done by the Joint Center for Political Studies in 1986, Houston placed 18th in an index using home ownership and income as a percentage of white income. Dallas didn't make the top 25 in that survey. Unfortunately, there is no parallel data for Hispanics. However, it should be clear that there are large black and Hispanic middle classes in the U.S. today, and that every state needs to nurture their development. Hispanics represent a $60 billion market in the U.S., blacks over $70 billion. With increased expectations on the part of minorities, the nation (and Texas) will have to provide the education and job structure that will allow these expectations to be fulfilled.

At the moment, *political* access seems to be increasing, with 286 black mayors in 1986 in the U.S., and 260 black elected officials in Texas in 1985, according to the Joint Center for Political Studies. The 1986 Rand study, *Closing the Gap*, indicated that 68% of working black males were middle class today, compared with 22% in 1940. Texas also shows 1427 elected Hispanic officials in 1984, the largest number of any state according to the NALEO Education Fund. (The number of Hispanic mayors has not been available.) We also need to point out the major increase in mobility for minorities, especially blacks, via the armed services. For example, in 1982 there were 76 black generals and admirals in the U.S.! One look for black leaders in the faculty club compared to the officers club should be enough to make the point. At the moment, it is not clear that Texas is actively promoting minority mobility through its educational system. The results would suggest otherwise.

At this point, a look at the Texas industrial and job base might be in order. For the chart on page 4, the first column indicates the percentage of the total work force employed in that area; the second indicates the economic output of that industry compared to the rest of the nation (100 being the state average score).

This table is grounds for cautious optimism. Although Texas is *currently* very vulnerable to economic shocks in oil and cattle, the potential for diversification is there. (The secret to California's stability is its diversity—when the state's $14 billion agricultural economy is off, it is buoyed up by the state's incredible *$28 billion* defense contract economy.) Texas has the capacity to build a strong and diverse service economy, particularly in the "high end" of financial, professional, consultation and personal services.

"High tech" is strikingly hard to define (about 20% of all U.S. workers are in high tech *industries*, but only about 3–4% of them do high tech *jobs*, requiring advanced training in electronics—math—technology), but however defined it will not save the Texas economy. High tech *manufacturing* is more characteristic of Silicon Valley, while the Boston 128 corridor runs to R and D. Austin, at present, has a nice blend of both. Alas, during the last oil price slide, computer stocks were sliding as well. The decision to locate the MCC (Microelectronics Computer Technology Consortium) in Austin was a true feather in Texas' cap a few years ago, but now that Bobby Inman has announced his resignation from the leadership of the MCC, and the performance results are at least ambiguous, it may be time for a stock-taking exercise on the future of "high tech" in Texas. Economic diversification would unquestionably be worth the price.

Some other statistical "odds and ends" may help to give the flavor of this complex state. First, the population is far more stable than the stereotypes would have us believe—Texas ranks *25th* in the percentage of citizens who were born in another state. Only 31% of the population moved in. For comparison, in Nevada, 70% of the people were born in another state. Transiency creates its own problems, particularly in terms of crime (Nevada has the highest murder rate per 100,000 citizens of any state, and is the most transient.)

However, Texas has the *second* highest murder rate of any state—16.9 murders per 100,000 population. In addition, three of its cities are in the top 25 in terms of murder: Houston ranks 5th with 39 murders per 100,000, Dallas is 6th with 35 and San Antonio is 14th with a rate of 20. The transiency hypothesis explains this data, but only partially. (The state ranks 7th in rape and 13th in terms of robbery.) Although not a crime *per se*, Texas ranks right behind the leaders in syphilis, Louisiana and Georgia. In terms of auto crime, 64% of Texas highway drivers break the 55 mph limit, making Texas #2. (Many Texans will be chagrined to know that New Mexico is #1 in speeding.) Interestingly, Texas is 10th in auto fatalities—although people speed, they tend to drive in straight lines on good roads. Few people speed in West Virginia, yet the state is 4th in auto fatalities, due to the fact that taking a curve in the West Virginia mountains at 10 miles an hour can cost you your life.

Some social issues are also interesting—Texas ranks 49th for single mothers on welfare. Only 20% of single mothers in Texas are receiving assistance, compared to 80% of Pennsylvania single mothers who get help. As a result, more children are living in poverty in Texas than in most states—of the 529,000 3 and 4 year olds in Texas in 1983, 143,000 of them (or 27%) were below the federal poverty line, according to the March 1984 Current Population Survey. In addition, Texas ranks 6th in births out of wedlock to women under 20 in 1983—34.6% of *all* children born in Texas in 1983 were illegitimate. Out of every 100 babies born in the state, 34 are out of wedlock. White babies born in Texas that year ranked 7th–23.7% were out of wedlock, while black births ranked 5th—77.5% of all black births in 1983 in Texas were to unmarried parents.

Texas ranks 24th in abortions—there were 290 abortions for every 1,000 live births in 1980. For comparison, in New York State there were 666 abortions for every 1,000 live births! If one can hold the ethical issue apart from the social policy issues, it is one more reason that states will become more unlike each other. In addition, in Texas, there are 519 divorces for every 1,000 marriages. Actually, this is a mid-range figure—Arkansas has 864 divorces for every 1,000 marriages!

All of this data suggest a state in which there is more crime than transiency, many sources of emotional instability, including a rapidly shifting family structure, a large minority population that is not achieving middle class membership in large numbers, and a *very* large number of children who are born "at risk," either through poverty or family structure. Restlessness is found in Texans both on the prairie and (for most Texans) in the big city.

Many Texans seem to think of their state as if it were a nation, and their identity seems to be created within the state boundaries. For example, Texas ranks 49th in the percentage of eligible voters who went to the polls in the last national election. Much more political energy seems to be reserved for local and state contests. Only about 7% of its high school graduates go out of the state for college. (In Connecticut, 45% go out of state, while New Jersey loses 39% of its high school graduates to other states for college.) Texas is clearly big enough to absorb most people's total identity. As we have said, it is a state with vast potential, but it has not yet evolved the structure that will assure it a modicum of stability.

Let us now concentrate on the state's educational system, beginning with elementary and secondary schools. Overall, the state's enrollment looks like this:

This analysis makes some things very clear.

- During the Seventies, while U.S. schools were declining in enrollment, Texas showed a steady increase.
- Minority students in Texas public schools in 1986 are a virtual majority.
- Like most states, Texas made progress in teacher salaries and per pupil expenditures, yet almost 20% of Texas children are in poverty.
- Almost 1/3rd of Texas youth begin adult life without a high school diploma, and the recent Texas school reform legislation may *increase* that figure.
- Texas does not like to spend tax money for education, either for teacher salaries or other direct educational expenditures.
- Statewide coordination of the over 1,000 school districts in Texas has not been a major goal, due largely to a lack of willingness to increase state tax dollars for public schools. The state is still 46% state funds, 46% local funds and 8% federal. The October 1986 tax reform legislation will not change the percentages much.

TEXAS SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS: 1970–1982

	1970	**1982**	**NET**	**U.S.**
ALL STUDENTS	2,840,000	2,966,000	+ 5.1%	– 13.9%
GRADES 9–12	794,000	836,000	+ 5.3%	– 6.2%
GRADES K–8	2,046,000	2,150,000	+ 5.1%	– 16.7%
	1984–85	**1985–86**		
ALL STUDENTS	3,059,845	3,149,380	+ 89,535	
GRADES 9–12	1,371,965	1,376,253	+ 4,288	
GRADES K–8	1,687,880	1,773,127	+ 85,247	

TEXAS SCHOOL PROFILE

	Date	Ranking	Percent	Amount
High School Graduation Rate	1984	42nd	69%	*
Per Pupil Expenditures	1982	38th	*	$ 2,012
Per Pupil Expenditures	1985–86	*	*	$ 3,384
Teacher Salary	1982	30th	*	$15,715
Teacher Salary	1985–86	*	*	$24,419
Percent of Children age 5–17 in Poverty	1980	*	18.4%	*
Percent of Children Handicapped	1982	*	9.7%	*
Percent Students in Bilingual Programs	1982	*	6.0%	*

*Not Available





THE TEXAS SCHOOL REFORM MOVEMENT

Most of the last paragraph is now up for grabs, due to the massive school reform movement begun with the passage of House Bill 246 in 1981, which centralized curriculum requirements to the point of virtually eliminating local content options. The election of Governor Mark White in 1982 furthered the school reform agenda. Although he had promised teachers more money during the election, the state's economy made that impossible. Rather, a new committee, the Select Committee on Public Education (SCOPE), was created with Ross Perot, a wealthy computer magnate as chair. This committee dealt with far more than its original charge of teacher salaries, looking into virtually every aspect of schools. They concluded that what was needed was a top-down structure that looked like a Fortune 500 company, but which would have political figures at the top.

Out of this effort came the most sweeping legislation in the state's educational history, House Bill 72, passed in a special legislative session in 1984. It can only be described as a "top down" effort—all aspects of curriculum, scheduling, and assessment have now been centralized through a new state board of education, overseen by a watchdog committee of the state legislature called the Legislation Education Board. In point of fact, Texas really now has one school board, and the Legislation Education Board is it. As in a business, this "top management" group will now "run" over 1,000 local school districts, in everything from curriculum to minutes of school attendance per pupil to career ladders to "no pass, no play" and other rules.

In this very thorough reform effort, only one thing was left out—there is no money to pay for it. Even with the October, 1986 passage of a package of tax increases and budget cuts, there is no way House Bill 72 can be fully implemented. The meticulous regulations on teacher testing, career ladders, board training, minutes of instruction per student per teacher per school, *et al.* will require very intensive and "people-intensive" monitoring systems. For example, a second grade teacher is responsible for eight curriculum areas containing 214 "essential elements." For a class of 22 students, that teacher will have to track and report on 22 × 214, or 4708 areas of student progress. One thing is certain—a blizzard of paper will begin to descend upon Austin, and that paper is very expensive in terms of the human time it represents.

It is not at all clear that any state can *regulate* its way to excellence, but Texas is certainly going to try. Of all the 40 state reform efforts, the Texas initiative is based most completely on political structures and motives. Whether it will help existing centers of excellence in Texas public schools become even better (Skyline High in Dallas, Houston's superb work on bilingual teaching) or not is a very big question. Whether the very large Hispanic and black dropout rate can be improved through the reform efforts is perhaps the biggest question, in that it occupies virtually half of the young people who are Texas' future.

TEXAS HIGHER EDUCATION

Certainly a good example of a "top down" educational model is the Texas higher education system, with the University of Texas at Austin sitting on the top. If one looks at the number of distinguished scholars, endowed chairs, research grants, endowment, it is very clear that during the "boom" years of the oil industry, a truly great university was created, largely through sheer wealth. Symbolic of this centralization of wealth and status is the Permanent University Fund, now approximately $6 billion dollars worth, which can only be drawn upon by the University of Texas A & M. As of October, 1986, the University of Texas had leaped ahead of Harvard in total asset value for the first time. However, the financial forces that brought the incredible success to the University are now in decline, and it remains to be seen how the University's excellence can be maintained through an era of different state financial dynamics.

The Texas higher education system is more skewed to public institutions than most others—of the 156 postsecondary education institutions of Texas, 98 are public, and only 13 are independent non-profit while 36 are Protestant affiliated and 6 are Catholic. Into these institutions come 716,000 students (as of 1981), 585,000 of them undergraduate, 625,000 into public institutions, 90,000 into independent ones. When we look at the data by race, some clear trends appear:

TEXAS ENROLLMENTS BY ETHNICITY: 1981–1985

	2 YEAR		4 YEAR	
	1981	1985	1981	1985
BLACK	26,104	33,764	35,876	36,770
HISPANIC	43,346	56,587	42,211	47,430
ASIAN	2,674	6,764	4,652	10,042

TEXAS ENROLLMENTS BY ETHNICITY



During the period, two-year minority enrollments increased for each group, but spectacularly so for Asian Americans, particularly if the comparison is with the percentage of the state's entire population of Asians. The trend is exactly the same for four-year institutions, especially for the Asian pattern of going to the *highest* level of institution they can be admitted to, while black and Hispanic students tend not to "level up" but to "level down." The best example of "levelling up" is the spectacular data for graduate and professional enrollments in Texas for the same years:

TEXAS GRADUATE ENROLLMENTS BY ETHNICITY: 1981–1985

	GRADUATE		PROFESSIONAL	
	1981	*1985*	*1981*	*1985*
BLACK	4,333	3,818	649	753
HISPANIC	4,874	5,216	995	1,183
ASIAN	1,022	1,397	177	474

TEXAS GRADUATE ENROLLMENTS BY ETHNICITY



Part of the reason for the rapid increase of Asian Americans in graduate education is that their numbers are beginning to increase in the Texas general population. But normally it would take several generations before graduate enrollments would start to go up. Asian Americans *do* play "leap-frog" in higher education. Faculty positions represent the same general patterns:

FULL-TIME FACULTY BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE: 1977–1984

	BLACK	*HISPANIC*	*ASIAN*
PUBLIC 4-YR, 1977	674	391	334
PUBLIC 4-YR, 1984	648	495	731
PUBLIC 2-YR, 1977	278	400	29
PUBLIC 2-YR, 1984	370	561	51
PRIVATE 4-YR, 1977	180	105	130
*PRIVATE 4-YR, 1983**	136	124	141

*1984 data not available. See Graph on Page 10.

Asians "level up" even in terms of faculty positions! They are spectacularly overrepresented in 4 year institutions—in 1984 there were more Texas faculty at public 4 year institutions who were Asian Americans than who were black or Hispanic, even though Asians are only 2% of the state's population. The same is true for the private institutions, although the numbers are smaller and the growth rate is slower. *Faculty in Texas higher education will continue to become even more white and Asian.*

The need to recruit more minority students for Texas higher education is becoming clear, yet in the latest American Council on Education's "Box Score" on states' special efforts to recruit minorities to higher education, Texas is listed twice for "programs recommended" and nothing else, while California is listed in *27* categories, most of which are programs already operational. Although Texas public institutions of higher education were preoccupied in 1986 with absorbing a 10% cut in funding, many approaches to this problem (like cooperative relationships with high schools) cost virtually nothing.

Maximum development of the state's *human* resources could bring the greatest return on the state's massive investment in higher education. It must be observed that the state has clearly *bought* its way to excellence in its higher education system, while the public school system which feeds it is not seen as an area which spending can improve. Soon the state will have to look systematically at its *entire* "educational investment portfolio," from preschool to graduate school, to see where strategic investments could be most profitably and equitably made.

FULL-TIME FACULTY BY INSTITUTIONAL TYPE, 1977–1984



GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

It is clear that Texas is a state with enormous potential and enormous problems. The economy has much potential for future development and diversification, not just in oil, cattle and "high tech," but most important, in the high end of the service economy (financial services, professional services, etc.). The more diversified the economy, the greater the possibilities for security and stability. The state cannot diversify the job and business structure unless there is an educational system prepared to develop the state's *human* resources to their fullest.

The Texas population will be over 40% minority by the end of the century, and schools will be over 50%. There is a good base in the state for the further development of middle class minority populations in the future. If the 46% of Texas public school children who are minority fail in the educational system, go on welfare at 18 and remain there until 65, *no Anglo Texan can retire*. Because of demographic trends, the various ethnic groups in Texas are now running on the same tether—if minorities succeed in Texas, Anglos will benefit.

As many Texans realize, the educational system (*all* of it) is crucial for the state's development. Here are some specific recommendations that may be useful in this process:

1. A large number of youngsters in Texas are "at risk" before they even *begin* public school—poverty, lack of English speaking ability, physical and emotional handicaps, and parents with a low level of education are four. Given this fact, the state needs to look carefully at equalizing opportunity at a very early age—a statewide Head Start-type program would bring a highly favorable return on the investment. If there is one thing we have learned about education, it is that *it is easier and cheaper to start kids out successfully in the educational system and keep them at grade level than it is to catch up with remedial programs for tenth graders*. Early childhood programs are not cheap, but there is a vast economic cost to *not* having the programs also.

2. Next to pre-school, the greatest need is to increase the percentage of youth who are successful through the high school diploma. The state has some advantages in this regard. Unlike California, which now has the largest class sizes in the nation, Texas can "fine tune" the system it has. Recruitment of qualified minority teachers could become a goal for the whole educational system, including colleges and universities which recruit and train teachers. More needs to be discovered about the specific reasons for the high dropout rates in Texas.

3. The system of higher education needs to be considered as a system with several *equally excellent components*. Austin is indeed a marvelous institution in terms of its ability to gather human and financial resources. But how good is the teaching there? The question needs to be at least addressed. The Permian Basin Campus should have the capability of striving for its own kind of excellence, as should Del Mar College in Corpus Christi. At the moment, the system seems to have "levelled up," in that excellence is perceived as being the *unique* characteristic of the two institutions at the top. The future of the state is heavily in the hands of all sectors of higher education.

4. All through Texas education, local leadership has been frustrated by the continuing attempt to run things from the top of the state's political structure. Local school boards are unable to lead. Local school principals cannot develop new curricula that are geared to the specific needs of their students. (It's a very diverse state with very different educational needs in various regions.) Presidents of colleges and universities are part of an overly precise pecking order centering on Austin. Faculty are seldom rewarded for improved teaching. The independent colleges and universities, which form a band of excellence almost equal to the publics, are not included at the table for many discussions. All of these components need to sense that they are important in the scheme of things, that they are to a large degree in charge of their affairs.

5. There is a real need in Texas for some consideration of the "separate but equal" structures within which educational decisions are made. At the moment there are two "supercommittees," one for public schools and one for higher education. There is virtually no linkage of these two structures, nor of the decisions which occur within them. Yet the truth of the relationship is obvious—*Texas higher education can be no better than Texas public schools*. They run on the same tether.

6. As Anglo migration into the state slows, Texas youth become a minority majority. Special attention needs to be paid to a state program that will *create* winners, not just *pick* them. (Texas education seems designed to select achievers rather than to create them.) The difference is a major one. Texas in the future will have no "throw-away" youth who can be disposed of without concern. EVERY young person will have to fulfill his potential if the state is to fulfill its destiny.

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TEXAS—SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS

1. Stereotypes aside, Texas is a *very* urban state—79.6 percent of its 14 million people live in the state's 26 metro areas—the largest number of metros of any state. It is not a state of wanderers—70 percent of its people were *born* in Texas.
2. Texas is, for the next decade, the most unpredictable state in the nation. This is due largely to the state's $3.6 billion shortfall, now partially and temporarily resolved by the activity of fall, 1986. (No *permanent* solution has been developed—the idea of paying taxes to pay for services is not a popular idea in Texas.)
3. The Texas economy has more potential for diversification than is normally supposed. The dominance of oil, cattle and "high tech," which caused so much of the pain in the first half of the 80's, could form *one* base of a diversified economy which also had very strong "high-end" services—financial, personal, electronic, professional and a variety of new business starts in service areas. These are areas with high salaries, good educational levels and economic and job stability.
4. Dallas and Houston are remarkable in that they have grown in their suburban fringes without destroying the core city. Given the decline in core cities in most of our major urban areas, this is a very optimistic comment on urban growth in Texas.
5. The state has a very high crime rate—2nd in murders per 100,000 people, with 3 cities in the top 25. Venereal disease is a major Texas problem, and the state ranks 3rd in syphilis, right behind Louisiana and Georgia.
6. The state's overall population is 35% minority, while public school populations are 46% minority. The future of the state is that of a "minority majority," but it will happen after California.
7. Texas ranks 42nd in terms of retention to high school graduation—only 69% of its youth graduate from high school, which means that about one third of its youth face adult life without a high school diploma.
8. The current Texas school reform activity is as "top down" as can be found in the U.S. The costs of operating the system now enacted into law will be severe, and the retention rate to high school graduation will likely decrease. Texas seems to feel that money will buy excellence in higher education (Austin), but that view is not applied to excellence in schools.
9. Higher education in Texas puts great emphasis on the "flagship" institution. The state's higher education programs do not reflect the current diversity in the state's population, particularly in terms of transfers and in percentage of students who graduate.
10. The state needs to begin looking at how the various levels of the educational system interact. The ultimate objective needs to be a system which will maximize the human potential of *all* the citizens of Texas.